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In the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah
DAISY HELEN KINSLEY, sometimes
known as HELEN D. KINSLEY,
Individually and as Executrix of the
E::."1:3.t.e of Otho V. Kinsley, also known
as Otho Verne Kinsley, Deceased,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
v.

LEWIS H. LARSEN and
DOROTHY G. LARSEN, his wife,
Individually, and doing busineu as
LARSEN ENTERPISES and

CASE

NO. IOlll

BELCO PETROLEUM

OORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendants & Respmdents.

RISPONDENrS Ill•
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASI:
In tllis action appellant seeks to recover trun 1\'!llll(IDClent, moneys representing approximately one-half d the
purchase price of appellant's retamed mtere&t in certain
oil and gas leases previously sold to respoodent, al1hou&h
respondent has pa.id the full purchase price for 1he entire

interest involved in this proceeding to another party to the
law suit (not a party to this appeal since he admits liability to appellant) who acted "as agent" for appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set forth in appellant's brit!f
is inadequate to fully apprise the court of the facts before
the trial judge when respondent's motion for summary
judgment was granted. Respondent's statement of the
facts of the case will proceed by way of providing arnplifi.
cation and addition where appellant has failed, and point.
ing out the inaccuracies of appellant's statements.
Otho V. Kinsley, part owner, prior to his death, of the
oil and gas interests involved in this case will be referral
to as "Kinsley" while his widow, plaintiff and appellant,
will be referred to as "plaintiff". 1Defendant, respondea
Belco Petroleum Corporation, will be referred to as "Belco"
and defendant, Lewis H. Larsen, will be referred to •
··l..a.rEll''.
Before setting forth the facts immediately surrow»
ing the subject of plaintiff's law suit, it is important that
other background facts in the record be brought to the
court's attention to fully understand the character of tit
overall transaction between all of the parties to the law
suit. The first business dealings between Larsen, Kinslef
and Belco occurred in November of 1959 (R. 52, R 82 P.
20-22). At that time Larsen and Kinsley were the read
owners of the two mineral leases in question (R. 11-12).
Pursuant to negotiations between Larsen and Belco •
ag1eernent was entered into on November 6, 1959, pr<JVid.
ing for the assignment of the leases from Larsen and Kint
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ley to Belco (R. 49, 51, R. 82 p. 20-21). The assignment of
the interest retained a working interest end an over-~
royalty in Larsen and Kinsley ( R. 82 p. 34). Negotiations
for the assignment provided for by the November 6, 1959
agreement were handled exclusively by Larsen (R. 52, R.
82 p. 1-5, 20-34). The payment of the purchase price for
that assignment went directly to Larsen "for himself and es
agent for others" (R. 82 p. 25-26). In that tran&actiian
Kinsley did not give l..arsen a written power of attomey,
nor did he supply Belco with a written document OlltJkmg
Larsen's authority to act in Kinsley's behalf (R. 82 p. 4-5,
R. 52). Larsen remitted to Kinsley his share ~ the pro.
ceeds of the November 6, 1959 agreement and assignment
of the mineral interest (R. 82 p. 27-29). In early 1962
Larsen undertook negotiatiOllS with Belco leading up to
the agreement of March 16, 1962 which provided fer the
purchase by Belco of the interests retained by Larsen and
Kinsley pursuant to the November 6, 1959 agreement (R.
49, 50, 51, 53, R. 82 p. 36-41). Larsen acted for KBmey
in matters pertaining to the March 16, 1962 agreement
similarly to the manner in which he had acted tar Ktmley in the November 6, 1959 agreement except that he lmd
a telegram of authority in the Mardi 16, 1962 negotiatiaal
(R. 82 p. 42-50).
There are four major areas of tmdispJted ev'.cltnw

before the court in this case which conclusively estabU8bed
tile right of Belco to a Summary Judgment dlsn.....
plaintiff's claim against it. These facts are as follOWB:
l. Telegram ~ Otho V. Kinsley 1X> Lewis H. Lanen
dated FPbruary 15, 1962. whidl provided that "Pllramlt
to our telephone call this evening, this will be Yam"' au-

thority to dispose of our interest at not less than $160,.
000.00 or any amoWlt greater for which you dispose fl
your interest" (R. 46, 77, R. 82 p. 38). This telegI'ani
was presented by Lewis H. Larsen to Belco prior to tht
execution of the letter agreement of March 16, 1962, and
prior to the disbursement of the $384,000.00 purchatt
price for the reserved mineral interests of Kinsley and w.
sen (R. 82 p. 37, R. 53).
Kinsley executed and delivered to Larsen all the
necessary documents for the conveyance of the minenl
interests of Kinsley which documents were delivered to
Belco by Larsen at the time the full $384,000.00 purohaa!
price was paid over to him "as agent" by Belco (R. 5Q
R. 82 p. 49-50) .
2.

Contrary to appellant's as;ertion in Point V of her
brief, findings 2 and 3 of the summary judgment provki
no more than that which appellant admits, i. e., Kins1eJ
executed the assignments (to Belco) and placed these e.Jrcut.ed documents in Larsen's hands. Larsen subsequently
delivered the documents to Belco.

3. Larsen remitted $92,000 of the proceeds of di
sale to Kinsley on March 31, 1962, and the plaintiff tm
accepted and retained for her own use and benefit ttJi
partial remittance of the money due for the sale of di
Kinsley interest (R. 14, R. 1-10). Plaintiff and her coonsel have :retained a promissory note submitted by 1Au1e1
for the balance due in payment for the Kinsley intenl
and have made repeated attempts to collect same frGI
Larsen and at no time prior to including Belco in the •
tion against Larsen did plaintiff repudiate Larsen's autbrrity to receive payment for the Kinsley interest, and Cllt

mwticate such repudiation to Belco or return any portioo
of the proceeds of the sale to Belco or Larsen (R. 1-10, R.
82 p. 55-61).
4. After giving the mineral interest in questiun 1o
Kinsley ( R. 82 p. 7), Larsen made an agreement setHng
the mineral leases to Belco on November 6, 1959. 'lb!
saJe of the lease at that time retained to Larsen and Kimley the working interest and over-riding royalty for wbtdl
the $384,000.00 was ultimately paid on March 27, 1962 (R.
2). The payment for the transfer of the oil and ps lea8e
in November of 1959 was made by Belco direct to I..armi
"for himself and as agent" (R. 82 p. 25, R. 52). 'Ibat at
the time such payment was made pursuant to the Nowm- ·
ber 6, 1959 agreement. there was no written documen at
any kind or nature presented to Belco outlining ~ mathority for Larsen to act in behalf of athe!- perm although his own representations to Belco were that he acted
for himself and others, including Kinsley CR. 51, 52).
Lewis H~ Larsen then disblll'Sed the proceeds at said pm)'ment to the other parties of interest, including Klnllltv.
Kinsley did not at any time repudiate Larsen's anttw•tt.Y
or disclaim the proceeds of the November 6, 1959 sale (R.
82 p. 27-28).
Kinsley was apprised of the negotiations being conducted by Larsen for the sale of the retained inte.h:st wbldl
was consummated by the letter-agreement al March 16,
1962 CR. 82 p. 36-41, R. 49, 50, 51, 53). Notice as to tile •
amount of the purchase price for the retained inte1'est prior
to the execution of the March 16, 1962 agreement wu
immaterial due to the cont.ents of Kinsley's telegram to
Larsen ( R. 46).

6

The execution and delivery by Kinsley to Larsen u
the docwnents transferring the retained interest to Beko
is clearly admitted on page 4 of plaintiff's brief where plaJn,
tiff notes that there was no formal recorded power of at.
torney for Larsen to act as Kinsley's agent.
The only evidence in the record which indicates that
Kinsley at any time received direct payments from Bib
is contained in the answers to interrogatories by Lewi
Larsen indicating that they so directed Belco for pay.
ments covering royalties during the period between No.
vember, 1959 and March, 1962 (R. 5). As to negotiatica
and payments for the oil and gas lease (November 6, 1~
agreement) and the sale of the retained working interEi
and royalteis <March 16, 1962 agreement) all negotiations and payments proceeded directly by and througl
Larsen. Plaintiff a~rts that the promissory note sm
together with the $92,000.00 was not accepted by Kim1eJ
or plaintiff but was retained as evidence of indebtedness.
These assertions are not facts before the court but caiclusioos since the record shows that plaintiff accept.ed 1D
$92,000.00 and appropriated same to her own use and balefit through the estate of Kinsley, and did not return t!1
p~ry note, but in fact, attempted to collect sam
from Larsen in this lawsuit (R. 1-10. R. 82 p. 51-61).
It should also be noted that Kinsley and Larsen d
a portion of the mineral interest in question to a HanJ
Royster prior to any dealings they had with Belco (R. i1
p. 16). Larsen sent assignments to Kinsley who executld
and returned them to Larsen for his use in consurnmam.
the Royster sale ( R .82 p. 18) . Larsen made the deal, •
paid directly by Royster and then issued his (Larsea'll
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personal check to Kinsley for Kinsley's share of the pr<>ceeds of the sale (R. 82 p. 19).
It is to be further noted that the motion for summary

judgment filed by Beko was " . . . made and based upon
the pleadings, depositions. interrogatories, answers to interrogatories, admi~ions, and all other papers on file in
~aid cause . . . " (R. 47).
Plaintifrs assertion that the
trial judge did not consider Lewis Larsen's deposition is
therefore wholly unfounded.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
KINSLEY'S TELEGRAM AUTHORIZING LARSEN
TO "DISPOSE OF" KINSLEY'S INTEREST AT THE
PRICE STATED; KINSLEY'S PUTTING THE EXECUTED DOCUMENTS OF TRANSFER IN LARSEN'S
HANDS AND SUBSEQUENTLY KEEPING PART OF
TI-IE PROCEEDS OF TI-IE SALE, OONCLUSIVELY F.ST ABLISHES LARSEN AS KINSLEY'S AGENT TO SELL
KINSLEY'S INTEREST AND RECEIVE THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR SAME.
The telegram of February 15, 1962 from Kinsley to
Larsen was a specific authorization to Larsen to "dispolle
of" the Kinsley interest for $160,000.00 or more. 1be
phrase "to dispose of" in the transaction before the court
was at least synonymous with "sell" but in fact has •
broader meaning signifying any method of disposing of
pmpe1ty. Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 12
A p. 505, Mc.La.ran Gold Mine Co. v. Morron, 22 P 2d 975,
124 Mont. 382, State Ex Rel Cross v. Board of Land Com-

181. In this transa~
the fLxing of a minimum dollar price after using the Phra.t
"to dispose of" resolves any question regarding the natun
of the written authority granted to Larsen by Kinsley to
represent him in the transaction in question. He was
clearly an agent to sell Kinsley's interest on the fal'e ii
the telegram so appointing him.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion at page 9 of herb~.
Larsen's authority by the specific language of the tefe.
gram put in his possession by Kinsley was a clear authority
for him to sell Kinsley's interest, and receive for Kinsley
the proceeds of the sale.
Restatement of Agency 2d Sec. 62 p. 170, sets for1h
the following general rule:
"Authority to pay or to receive purchase price
(1)

Unless otherwise agreed, authority to con~
for a purchase or sale or to make or to receiw
a conveyance on terms by which part or all a
the price is payable at the time when the cm
tract or conveyance is made includes authoritJ
to pay or to receive so much of the price as ~
payable at such time.

(2)

Unless otherwise agreed, authority to purchu
chattels or choses in action includes authority
to pay for them if, but only if, the agent is air
thorized to receive possession of them or of the
documents representing them; authority to sell
chattels or choses in action does :r.ot include authority to receive the purchase price uni~ tJw
agent has been entrusted with them or with ii
documents representing them." (Emphasis SllP
plied).

The illustration supporting the above stated general
rule reads as follows at p. 170-171:
P gives A a power of attorney to sell and convey
land, nothing being said therein as to the receipt of
payment. A negotiates a sale and executes and delivers a deed of conveyance and receives the purchase
price. A is atuhorized to do this."

"l.

Although in the case before this court, we are not
dealing with a formal power of attorney sufficient to~
thorize Larsen to execute the conveyance himself, all of
the legal elements of the rule and example are pzesent since
a written authority to sell was given by Kinsley, and Kinsley placed the documents representing title to his interellt
in Larsen's hands prior to and at the time the transactkm
was consummated. In this respect the comment cm subsection ( 2) of the above quoted rule must be consldered.
It provides as follows at p. 171:
"b. The words, 'documents representing' a chattel or
chosen action mean documents such as bills of lading,
negotiable paper, and share certificates which, by law
or custom, so far represent the interest~ the owner
of the things to which they refer that hJs int.eresta
therein are transferred by a transfer of the documents.
The entrusting to the agent of such an lmtawwt la
a form such that it may be negotiated by him is equivalent to a.n entrusting of the thing lfllelf for t.be purpose of the rule stated In this seefioa." (»nphula
supplied).
It is interesting to note that plaintiff makes a particular point of the fact that Belco attempted to deal directly
with Kinsley in having him execute documents affecting
the transfer to Belco of his retained interests in the oil and
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gas leases. Plaintiff also points out that "Kinsley ret~
the various documents to Larsen, Who then delivered that
to Belco (R. 50, Plaintiff's Brief p. 4). The record is clelr
that Belco sent communication to Kinsley requesting u._
he execute the various documents and return them. ROI.
ever, Kinsley did not choose to return communicati<11. tt
Belco nor return the documents to Belco, but chose to tran.
sact all his dealings with Belco back through Larsen (R.
50). It is Belco's contention that this sWTOunding fld,
the placing of documents of transfer in the hands of i..
sen, together with the telegram authorizing him to &ell •
a stated price, are the conclusive facts as to Larsen's•
thority to receive payment for the Kinsley interest. Al
pointed out by plaintiff, there is no Utah case in point Cl
the legal proposition involved herein. However, the abolt
sl:a1l!d rules from the Restatement of Agency 2d, Supra lli
forth the universally accepted principle which governs tll
disposition of this case and supports the trial court's rulq
on the motion for summary judgment. In support of :ee&.
co's contention, the court's attention is also called
statement of Agency 2d, Sec. 56 p. 162, Sec. 71 p. 183. Aia
see Campbell v. Gowans 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397.

to•

The court's attention is called to the annotation at I
ALR 2d 805 and the cases supporting the above rule then
set forth at Section 10 at p. 820. The cases in this allllt
tation which do not support the general rule as above e
forth are distinguishable on grounds that the admitted •
thority given the agent was not as broad (authority to sell
as the authority in the instant case.
In addition to the foregoing written authorizati<Jl I
sell coupled with the placing of documents of title

in*
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hands of the agent so authoriz.ed, another surrounding fact
which confirms the authority of Larsen to receive payment
for Kinsley is the ratification of the transactioo by plaintiff by her retention of nearly half of the proceeds of the
sale remitted to her by Larsen, and her effort to collect
trom Larsen on his promise to remit the balance embodied
in the Promissory Note. It is to be noted that the attempts
to collect this balance from Larsen lasted for in excess ot
one year after plaintiffs receipt of the Primissory Note
and the $92,000 payment. The record is bare of. any fact
showing notice to Belco of repudiation of Lara!n's authority
during this period, nor did plaintiff return to Belco any
of the proceeds of the sale. All of this conduct amounts
to ratification of Larsen's agency to receive payment for
Kinsley.
The court's attention is called to .S.ta*-at of Apacy 2d, Section 98 p. 252, which provides as follows:
"The receipt by a purported principal, with knowled9e
of the facts, of something to which he would not be
entitled unless an act purported to be done fer him
were affirmed, and to which he makes no claim except
through such act, constitutes an affirmance unless at
the time of such receipt he repudiates the act. If ..
repudiates the act, bis receipt of be&eftta .,....... t 11
an aftirmance at the election of t.lle other puV to tll9
tra.nsaction." (Emphasis supplied) .

The canment on the above quoted rule aet b1ll at
p. 252-253 is worthy of note:
Ordinarily, the receipt by a pwported prindJlal
who knows the facts, of thinp ro which be woa1d - entitled unless the transaction were raU&.d 11181 tu
which he makes no claim hlclepeacleaUy el tM met el

"(a).
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the purported agent, indicates his consent to ~
a party t.o the transaction as it was made. Even if b!
disclaims responsibility for the act of the purportej
agent, however, he becomes subject to liability to~
person from whom the things were obtained to ~
same extent as if he had consented to become a llal'b
to the transaction, provided that he receives its~
ceeds with knowledge of the facts. Thus, if an agen
inserts in a contract a clause not binding on the prjn.
cipal and thereby obtains something from the other
contracting party, the acceptance of such thing by th!
principal with knowledge of the unauthorized clall!
in the contract subjects him to liability upon the l'a\.
tract as made. Likewise, if an agent or purponai
agent obtains goods or money by a fraud for wtm
the principal was not liable, the acceptance of the pro
ceeds of the fraud by the principal with knowledge a
the facts subjects him to liability for the fraud." (F.zn.
phasis supplied) .

Since Kinsley and plaintiff had knowledge of the fact
that they had given a written authorization to Larsen tc
sell their retained mineral interest, had placed in his ham
the documents of title duly executed so that title cook!
pass upon delivery by Larsen to Belco, and retained the
benefits of the bargain, $92,000 having been delivered by
Larsen to plaintiff, it cannot be said that Kinsley and plaintiff acted without knowledge of all the facts sllITOU11dQ
this transaction.
Not only, with this knowledge, did Kinsleys receive a
substantial share of the proceeds of the sale, but have retained the money so received since the transaction in quet
tion, and still retain that money to this moment. In thil
respect the court's attention is called to Restatement ;
Agency 2d, Section 99 p. 256:

"Tlw rett-ntion b~· a purported principal, with knowlPLige of the facts and before he has changed his position. of something which he is not entitled to retain
w1l~s an act purported to be done on his account is
affirmed. and to which he makes no claim except
through such act. constitutes an affinnance unle$ at
the time of such retention he repudiates the act. Even
if he repudiates the act. his retention constitutes an
affirmance at the election of the other party to the
transaction." (Emphasis supplied).
The L'OU11:'s attention is also called to Restatement ot
Agenc~· 2d, Sections 94 and 95 at pp. 242, 246. The above
princ1ples are adhered to in Utah. M088!i v. MacFartaae,
119 Utah 602. 230 P'2d 571.
Without any further facts than those surrounding the
t mnsaction as above outlined, it is clear that Larsen's aut honty to act in Kinsley's behalf in making the agreement,
and in receiving payment upon transfer of documents embodying title entrusted to him was clear. This establishes
as a matter of law, agency to receive the payment and~
ports the trial court's decision.
POINT Il

THE PRIOR CONDUCT OF KINSLEY AND LARSEN WHEREBY NEGOTIATIONS, SALE AND RD :El Pl'
OF PROCEEDS OF SALE WERE ALL HANDLED
THROUGH LARSEN WHEN THE MINERAL LEASE
IN QUESTION WAS INITIALLY SOLD TO BELCO, ~
TABLISHED LARSEN AS KINSLEY'S AGENT FOR
PURPOSES OF SELLING, AND RECEIVING PROCEEDS OF THE SUBS~UENT SALE FOR 1HESE
PARTIES, AND THE DEAD MAN'S STA'IVI'E DO~

14
NOT RENDER LARSEN INCOMPEl'ENT AS A
NESS TO THIS PRIOR COURSE OF CONDUCT.

Wl'r.

As heretofore set forth in the Statement of Factl,
in November of 1959, Lewis Larsen, acting for himself,~
as agent for others, negotiated with Belco and ultimat.9J
said to it the two mineral leases in questioo. At this tint
Kinsley had an interest in the mineral leases. Kinsley eJll.
cuted and delivered to Larsen the necessary legal docQ.
ments assigning his interest in the mineral leases to Bekt
Petrolemn Corporation. Larsen delivered Kinsley's asm.
ment, together with his own assignment to Belco at Ult
time the proceeds of the sale were pa.id. Belco issued Ila

drafts in payment of the mineral leases in questioo "
"Lewis H. Larsen, for himself and as agent". Larsen tbm,
by persooal check, remitted to Kinsley the amount tb
him for his share of the proceeds of the sale. The Novs
ber 6, 1959 transaction retained to Kinsley and Larsen 1
working interest and an over-riding royalty in the leaa
niese retained interests are the subject of the instant 1suit. The March 12, 1962 Agreement and March 27, 1911
payment by Belco resulted in a complete vesting in Beirl
of all interests in the two leases in question.
Again tuming to the Restatement for the

sta.temm

the general principle, the court's attention is directed •
Restatmaent of Agency 2d, Section 26, p. 100:

~

"Section 26.

Creation of Authority: General Rule

Except for the execution of instruments undlr

seal or for the performance of transactions requll'li
by statute to be authorized in a particular way, •
thority to do and act may be created by written •
spoken words or other conduct of the principal wt**'
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reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that
the principal desires him so to act on the principal's
account.''
The comment on the above quoted rule at p. 102 of
the above cited work and the illustration there set forth
a.re worthy of note:
"c. Ways of making maaifest&Uom. The authority
to perform a particular act c'arl be ccnferred by the
specific words of a statement to the agent; it may be
created by directing an agent to perform acts which
involve tht> performance of the act in question; or it
may be inferred from words or conduct which the
principal has reason to know indialte to the agent tDat
he is to do the act for the benefit of the principll. '!be
rules for the interpretation of the principal's oonduct
are stated in SectiOl'lfi 32·81."

"Illustrations:
4. P delivers a chattel to A and a.uthorias tdm ·
to sell it for cash. Nothing is said a.bout delivery to
the purchaser or the receipt of payment by A. Hav·
ing contracted to sell the chattel, A. has authority to
deliver the chattel to the buyer and to receive "the PD' ·
chase price."
Silence by the principal, or failw-e to object to put
acts of the agent, will manifest the autbarizaticn al. the
agent to do the act in question. 'Ibe comment on the abow
cited rule at p. 102 provides as follows:
"d. Silence as a lll&DitNtadoL '1be manife8tatlon ot ··
the principal may consist of his failul"e 'txJ object· to
unauthorized conduct. See sectioo 43. 'Ibis is so if,
in view of the relations between the prindpal ·and
agent and all other circumstances, a reasoriaNe per-
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son in the position of the principal knowing of wta.u.
thorized acts and not consenting to their continuance
would do something to indicate his dissent. In sUCh
cases the agent can reasonably infer that the Principal wishes him to continue so to act. Thus, a secre.
tary who, without previous authorization, purchases
office supplies which are paid for without ob.iecti<11
by the principal, can .reasonably conclude that the
principal wishes a continuance of this practice am
hence would be authorized to continue to purchase
similar supplies.''
The general rule and discusmon thereof from the Be.
statement of Agmcy 2d is followed in the State of Utah.
Malla, State Bank Com'r et a.I v. Giles et a.I, 100 Utah 562,

114 P2d 208.

In the Malia case, supra., the question involved the ownership by the Bank Com'r of a water company stock certificate which had been endorsed, as to the wife's interest
therein over to the Bank by the husband. The questDI
was Whether or not the husband was authorized to so endorse the certificate over to the Bank in connection with
all busines; affairs and dealings of the husband and wife
with the Bank which by prior conduct the husband had
repeatedly handled by himself. Althrugh the court fOllld
no specific background of dealings which would justify a
finding that the husband was authori7.ed to endorse in b
wif~s name, the court recogni7.ed the above general prtn.
ciples of agency relative to the manifestations of authority
by silence or prior oonduct, and at page 211 of the Patlle
Report the following is stated:
''The extent of an agent's apparent authority is Id
measured by the extent of power exercised by th!
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agent; but by the principal's conduct with refen!flCe
to the power exercised by the agent. Either by action
or by inaction where there is a duty to a.ct, the prindpal may create a situation the reasonable interpretation of which, by a third party with whom the agent
is about to deal, is such as to lead that third party to
believe that the agent has authority to deal with him
as contemplated. Under such circumstances the law
will hold the principal responsible to that third party
for the results of that deal with the agent. But the
conduct of the principal must be such as occurs prior
to the deal, and not subsequent thereto. 1be latter
conduct may have evidentiary value as a recognition
by the principal of his former conduct, or may evidence a waiver of his right to object to lack of. authority in his agent; but to be the inducement for the
third party to enter into an agreement with the agent,
the conduct must occur prior to the agreement."
The court's attention is also called to C.J.S. ApaCJ
Section 96, p. 213-14, and Restatement of ~ 2d, See-tions 26. 34, 43 and 71.
The testimony establishing the prior course ot oanduct between Larsen-Kinsley and Belco is set forth in the
deposition of Lewis H. Larsen and the affidavits al L. E.
Eggertsen and Lawrence Ruben. As to the deposition al
Larsen, plaintiff interposed an objection that the same
was inadmissible since Larsen was incompetent as a witness by the operation of the "Dead Men's Statute". This
contention is eITOneOUs.
The Utah "Dead Man's Statute" is found at Section
78-24-2 (3) Utah Code Annot. 1953. In analyzing this
statute and its applicability to Larsen in the instant cae.
the discussion here will be confined to the first al four cat-
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egories suggested by Chief Justice Wolfe in his article "In.
competency of Witnesses in Utah to Transactions With~
ceased, Insane or Incompetent Persons" 13 Rocky Mtn. L
Rev. 282 (1941). It is to be noted as pointed out by Jus.
ti.ce Wolfe, that all four of the following must exist to ren.
der Larsen incompetent as a witness in these Proceedings:

1.

statute.

That Larsen is the type of person disqualified b)i

2. That the present action is the type of p~
in regard to which the disqualification exists.
3. That the subject matter is the type as oo wtJidi
there is a disqualification.
4. That the disqualification has not been removed.
A finding in favor of Belco under any of these headings affirms the presumption in favor of competency d
the witness since the statute requires the presence of eedi
of the first three elements, ie. specific type of person, •
c:ific type of proceeding and specific type of subject Dllt·
ter and the absence of the last element, ie. waiver d. d>
jection, before the statute becomes operative.
The Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the amfuslon surrot.mding the Utah Statute V'8lUshes when a C8l'fo
ful analysis of the inrent and purpose of the statute is mali
And, the ax.u1: has anal:y7.ed the intent and purpose of UI
statute as follows:

'The purpose of the statute is to guard against 1il
temptation to give false testimony in regard to a tm
saction with a deceased person by the surviving party.
when the transaction is involved in a lawsuit and ded
has sealed the mouth of the other party. Furtblf
more the statute seeks to put the two parties ~
terms of equality in reganl to giving evidence d. t11

transaction . . . It was never intended that this section should be used for the purpose of suppressing the
truth. On the contrary, the statute's sole purpose is
to prevent the proving by false testimony of claims
against the estate of a deceased person." (Ma.xfteld
v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P2d 122 {1946).
An important consideration in the application of the

Dead Man's Statute in this case was articulated by the
Utah Supreme Court many years ago.

( "T) The scope of the rule excludes the testimony
of a survivor of the transaction with a decedent when
offered against the latter's estate ... The statute in
this regard is intended to protect the estates of deceased persons from assaults 'and relates to proceedings wherein the decision sought by the party so testifying would tend to reduce or impair the estate
''' (l\liller v. Livingston, 31 Utah 415, 434, 88
Pac. 338 (1906).
Or to restate the basic policy of the statute involved
m this case in the words of Chief Justice Wolfe:
"On the one side is a person who is seeking to protect
the integrity of the estate or recover assets claimed to
belong to it; on the other side is a person who seeks
to subtract from the estate or resist recovery of claimed
assets. The statute is for the benefit of the first side
and operates against the opposing party. Therefore
when one stands on the estate, affirms and acknowledges it for the support of his interest or claim whether
that interest be derived directly or through heirs or
other~ who took or claimed through the estate he
can take advantage of the statute. But he whose
claim depends upon subtracting from the estate or on
establishing the fact that the property did not beJoog
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to or was not derived from the estate is made inCQn.
petent by the statute. Where all parties stand oo Ult
estate for their rights but their controversy is oYe
their respective shares, as in will contest, the stan.e
does not apply." (Wolfe, Competency of Witnl'91P.g
in Utah to Transactions with Deceased, Insane or Jn.
cmnpetent Person, 18 Rocky Mtn. L Rev. 28'2, 21

(1941)

Defendant Belco contends that the basic policy of

u.

Dead Man's Statute is inapplicable to the present suit shn
the cmt:roYersy does not concern the question of whethr
er mt the estate of plaintiff's decedent is owed $100,00J
for the payment ~ deceased's interest in the oil leases IQ·
daaed by defendant Belco, but the question is Who owa
the estate $100,000 for decedent's interest in the oil le&Sll'
'Ibus, Belco does not seek to "reduce or impair" the estu
er 10 otter evidence against the decedent's estate. Betm's
<mly int.e!'est is to ascertain which party has the legal ~
ligatim al enhancing the estate, if in fact the estat.e Ill
not received payment for decedent's interest in the cj
leases.
1be first question is whether Larsen is the type of per900 diSllBlified under the Utah versioo of the Dead Mam
Statu12'!

Sectioo 78-24-2 (3), Utah Code Annot. 1958, disqun
fies three types of witnesses:

1. A pu1;y to the proceedings;
2.

Any person directly interested in the event of tt1

pnaed.i11g;
3. Any person from, through or under whom Sid
pmty ar interested person derives his interest or title I

any i-rt thereof.

From the facts of the present controversy it is readily
apparent that Larsen does not fall within the third cate~ory, but. at first blush. it would seem that Larsen does
tall within the first category, a party to the proceedings.
The Ctah Supreme Court, however, has not given this
The court has held
13Jl.gtlage such a wide interpretation..
that the party must be one opposing or suing the executor
ur administrator of the estate. To phrase the rule in shorthand fashion the party must be one who is adverse to the
interests of the estate. (Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah
280. 286, 172 P'2d 122 (1946). Coosequently the statute
is inapplicable to testimony by the agent of the survivor
or to testimony by the agent of the deceased. (Morrilon
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 11 Utah 2d 416, 360 P2d 1015
(1961, Wolfe, Competency of Witnesses in Utah to Transactions with Deceased, Insane or Incompetent Persons, 13
Kooky Mtn. Law Re\·. 282. 284 (1941).
And, the fact that the agent "may feel a moral responsibility for a mistake and seek to correct a wrong he
believes he created does not place him in a category where
he is a party directly interested in the event." (Sble v.
Harper, 118 Utah 415. 222 P'2d 571 (1950).
The next question presented by this subdiviskJn is
whether or not Larsen is one having "a direct inten!st bl
the particular action and not merely an interest in the estate." (Clark v. George, 120 Utah, 350, 356, 234 P2d 844
(1951). And the joinder of a persoo as a party which is
merely nominal or for the purpose of suing m a ~
claim does not render that person a "party to an action"'.
See Maxf"leld v. Sainsbury, Supra, Clark v. George, Supra,
Anderson v. Johnso&, 121 Utah 173, 239 PM 1073 (1951);

Sine , .. Harper, Supra, Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2.«i }l
381 P2d 78 (1963) .

Larsen is not being sued on the same legal tlleCI),
Belco, even though Larsen and Belco are joined in the
1111
claim. The basic theory of the claim against Larsen is GI
version, the common law tort of exercising dominioo 1
C<Xltrol over the property of another. (See Shi,._ 1
Common Law Pleading Sec. 45 ( 1923). Althoogh Heb
joined in the same "cause of action" the basic tbeoey 1
plaintiffs claim against Belco is debt, not the tort c1 11
version. Thus the claim against Larsen is not the•
as the claim against Belco.
Moreover, Larsen has conceded the validity rl p.
tiff's claim against him and is no more than a IDllll
party to the law suit as far as the estate is concerned.
sequently, Larsen does not fall into the category of

ca

a.._

with an interest in the claim as to which his ~1
sought by Belco and does not come within the first t9
gory of witnesses disqualified by the statute. As
preme Court of Utah noted in a case analogous to the•
usual features of this case:

ima

"It would seem, therefore, that 'party interested' 111
sh<x.tld refer to a party whose interest in the event•
the suit are adverse to the interests of the demi
person and his estate, and not persons whose int.en1
are with the deceased person." (Mower v. . .
64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911 (1924).
The interests of defendant Belco are with the . .
since Belco does not seek to diminish it, and, the intl!lll
of Larsen are with the estate since Belco seeks to well
sen's testimony in support of its claim that l..ar9eD II

.1uthonty to eoilt'<-"t tht:> payment in controversy.

For Lar-

" ·r1 r u ll'~tlf y m &•ko' s favor would mean he is testifying
1!1 t ;n 01 1 'f t hl' esta tl' and against his own interest--a recL>:..;rn/.t·c1 •-'X!'f'J•t1on to tilt> Dead Man's Statute (MufieW v.
Sa..inshur~ . Supra 1--and for him to testify against defend.-rn t Belco ;mct in fa\·or of tht:> estate would mean his interest
is not adverse to the estate. (Mower \', Mower, Supra).
If it is assc: rt ed that Larsen has an interest in not

found liabl<• on a conversion theory since the estaJ:>.
l1sh.Jnt-nt of this typt:• of debt would mean it is a non-disc·har-g<~blt• ~Jt under the Bankruptcy Act (Bankrap&cy
At·t, St'\'. 11 ta> lL~s the six categories of non-dischargehein~

ahl·· dl'hts I is dt"dr!y not su..~tainable. A finding that Lar-;pn <-onvPrtl'd the money paid him by Belco for Kinsley's
l>cnefir d0t."S not mean that this debt of Larsen to KinslL•y's Pstak is non-dischargeable. The Supreme Court has
expressly held that Section 17 (a) (2} of the Bankruptcy
Act does not necessarily include debts created by an ad
uf conversion. Before the debt resulting from convenkm

Bankruptcy
Act. it must be shown in the bankruptcy court that the
l'Onversion was \\illful and malicious, amounting to fraud
<tnd t~mbezzlemmt.
(Da\is \", Aetna Acceptance Co., 293
becomes a non-dischargeable debt W1Cler the

tr . .S.

:~:!~ t 1 ~n-1 J.

Plaintiff needs only to show a wrongful

1•xerd.se of dominion and control by Larsen to maintain

its second count against him. 1ln~ Larsen's liabiltty on
plaintiff's second throry creates no adverse interest on the
rxu1 of Larsen because of some imagined bankruptcy Pl'C>'
L-1 "'.•din,,.-rs.
Even if bankruptcy proc-eedings were instituted.
tht• fact that Larsen was found to have converted f\mds
\\'ould have no effect on the question of the discharge-

11

.!4

abl11t\

l)J th1·

a.D<'t" ('o.,

th·ht m i>anknlpky.

:-;upra I

\\ lwth.T •1 dt. ht 1s disc:hargcablt' or not in b·

1s a qc.i··..;t1· •n to I)(' rl1."<.·icil'd b~ tht.' bankruptcy court.
l"&I Loan Co. , .. Hunt, :!9:2 lJ. S. :!:).t t 1~H-1).

It rht•r'f'fort' S(.>t'ms dear that the "Dead Man's
0(~ not n•n<it-r Larst.'n ineomp~'tent a<\ a witness in
pnxi:>t·din:.::-.; because ht.• is not a person disqualified by
...tatute. bt•mg only a nominal pa11y, having admitted
liab1lit~ to the estate and thus not directly interet1ta1
the t"'\'1._~t of the> proceeding. His (Larsen's) ~
therefore admissable to conclusively establish the ·
course of dealings between himself and Kinsley in
leading up to and including the transaction in questQ.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons here set forth. it is submitted
the judgment of the lower court was correct am

be affumed.

Respectfully submitted,

GIDRGE E. BALLIF, for
BALLIF & BALLIF
84 East 100 South
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents

